Abstract: This paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in which asset markets arise as choice of financial intermediaries. The economy is modeled as a two stage game as in Bisin [8] . In the first stage intermediaries set up the financial structure according to the expectation that they have for the second stage outcome. In the second stage, consumers behave as price takers in the commodity market and in the previously created assets market. We consider that intermediaries form their expectations using continuous random selections from the second stage equilibrium correspondence (differently from Bisin [8] where an endogenous beliefs expectation was used). We establish the existence of equilibria in mixed strategies and moreover, we obtain an approximate equilibria in pure strategies by modeling explicitly the incomplete information that each intermediary has about others intermediaries fixed cost functions.
INTRODUCTION
In the general equilibrium models with exogenously given financial markets, the properties of final allocations depend on the fixed structure of these assets. Our purpose is to provide a model where the asset structure arises endogenously as choice of economic agents. This issue was already studied in the literature and the papers by Allen and Gale [5] , Duffie and Jackson [12] , Duffie and Rahi [13] , Hara [22] and Pesendorfer [29] constitute the first references to this topic. Nevertheless, the more general framework was developed in the paper by Bisin [8] .
In Bisin [8] , the economy is composed by two kind of agents, intermediaries that are imperfectly competitive and consumers that are price takers. The intermediaries design the payoff of the securities that they issue and choose the spread they charge on each security in order to maximize profits. A fixed cost and a proportional transaction cost are required to intermediate each security. Equilibrium prices are fixed by a Walrasian auctioneer to clear the spot and security markets and prices and demands are rationally anticipated by intermediaries. Then, the intermediaries are able to evaluate their profit for each financial structure, therefore, they are able to choose the financial structure that gives them an optimal profit. Using this setup Bisin obtains the existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies.
The framework of our work follows the setup of Bisin. However, we take up a different approach to solve the model. Besides, we obtain, not just the existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies, but also the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies. We remark that our tool can be applied also in other approaches, for instance, exchange economies where assets are designed by consumers. The models of Braido [9] and Faias[PhD diss] are examples of this class of economies.
In Bisin [8] and in this work the behavior of the intermediaries is modelled by a game. In this game the intermediaries maximize their expected payoff functions anticipating the Walrasian prices. Our model diverges from the model of Bisin in the way how the intermediaries form the expectations. More precisely, Bisin uses admissible beliefs and the Nash equilibrium existence results for games with upper-hemicontinuous profit correspondences due to Simon-Zame [32] . We use the random selection technique introduced by Allen [3] and explored by Mas-Colell and Nachbar [27] , Allen [4] and Stahn [33] in models of imperfect competition in complete markets. We show the existence of a continuous random selection in the Walrasian equilibrium correspondence which implies the continuity of each player's payoff function. From this continuity we obtain the equilibrium in mixed strategies for the asset creation game. However, another important consequence of this continuity is that we can go one step further and obtain a pure strategy solution by explicitly modelling intermediaries' incomplete information with respect to competitors' fixed cost functions, within a family of linear functions of the mean and variance of the asset return. We apply the results of Milgrom and Weber [28] , to get the existence of equilibrium in distributional strategies.
Finally, exploring the Liapunov convexification theorem, we obtain the generic existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies (which associates to each type a pure strategy).
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in section 2. In section 3 we define the equilibrium concept and present the result of existence of equilibrium. In section 4 we introduce incomplete information and establish the existence of distributional strategy equilibrium and the generic existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies.
THE ECONOMY
The model has two stages with two periods in the second stage, t = 0, 1. Uncertainty on the states of nature over the period 1 is denoted by s ∈ S = 1, 2, . . . , S.
There are l = 1, . . . , L commodities in each periods and state. Let n = (S + 1)L be the number of states and time contingent goods of the economy. (A.3) u i is monotonic in commodity 1(s) for each s ∈ S: Letx be any consumption plan that is nonnegative in every coordinate, and strictly positive at 1(s)
Consumers.

Each consumer
for some s ∈ S. Then for all x ∈ IR n ++ , u i (x +x) > u i (x).
Intermediaries.
We consider that in this economy there are h = 1, . . . , H intermediaries who design assets and provide financial transactions. These designers are alive only at period 0, are endowed with the good 1 and have utility just on this good.
Each security in the economy is characterized by a payoff vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a S ), where a s for each state of nature s is a numeraire return denominated in units of good 1. We assume that each intermediary can issue at most J h assets, which is an exogenous given number. Let J = . Given an asset structure A we denote byĴ the maximal number of independent columns of this matrix, that is, the minimal number of assets that span the space spanned by this financial structure.
The bid-ask spread for each asset a is described by a non linear function that we assume with the form G(γ)(z) = γz 2 . The bid ask spread function is the same for all assets apart from the parameter γ which is also a choice of the intermediary that design the asset. We assume that the spread parameter γ is chosen in a certain set of admissible spread parameters that, as in Bisin, we suppose compact. Let the set of admissible spread parameters be Γ = [γ, γ], in the strictly positive axis. Since γ > 0, by taking this spread function, we are assuming that the bid-ask spread on each asset is an increasing function of the quantity of the asset that is transacted. We also remark that since G(γ)(z) > 0 if z = 0, then when a consumer buys an asset he pays more than its market price and when a consumer sells an asset he receives less than its market price. Spreads are also denominated in units of good 1.
These costs and this spread describe the technology that is available to create the asset markets structure in this economy.
We consider that the intermediary just have endowment and gets utility from the good 1 of the first period. The purpose of the intermediaries will be to maximize profits, that is, to maximize the difference between the spread and the costs of the asset. We denote by z = (z 1 , ..., z J ) a portfolio of assets in this economy and by z + = (z +1 , ..., z +J ) the corresponding portfolio of asset purchases.
The payoff of the intermediary h associated with a portfolio z is:
The Economy with an Asset Market Structure Fixed.
Suppose that an economy {(u 
Definition 1. A Walrasian equilibrium for a given vector of spread parameters γ
and for a given asset return structure A is a collection The main theorem of the next section requires that the aggregate demand function be continuously differentiable. The S + 1 occurrences of the walras law allow us to drop S + 1 markets, and if one of that markets is precisely the market of the commodity 1 in the first period then the aggregate excess demand function in the remaining markets can be written has: By homogeneity in prices we can take as the set of prices the simplex ∆ Allen [3] , Mas-Collel and Nachbar [27] and H. Stahn [33] .
The equilibrium correspondence which maps a vector of spread parameters γ and a matrix A into the related set of Walrasian prices that arises in the second stage of the economy, is defined using the aggregate demand function as follows:
This correspondence is not continuous essentially due to jumps in the cardinality of the equilibrium set. If we adopt the random selections technique, this problem disappears. In fact, if one has in mind that the selection represents the inherent uncertainty about the market clearing price levels, we can assume that each consumer assigns a zero probability to a price level on a fold (unstable structure) because any small mistake in the price observation can lead to drastic errors in the evaluation of the indirect utility, i.e., in evaluating the payoffs.
Following the approach of Mas-Collel and Nachbar [27] the main tool to obtain a continuous random selection in the equilibrium is the Michael selection theorem . The Michael selection theorem states that a correspondence from a paracompact space to a complete, metrizable, locally convex, linear space, which is lower hemicontinuous and takes (non-empty) closed and convex values admits a continuous selection [see C. Aliprantis and K. Border [1] ]. We will consider the subcorrespondence of quasi-regular equilibrium (this concept will be defined later) and prove that this subcorrespondence verifies the Michael selection theorem, then the subcorrespondence admits a continuous random selection which, actually, is a continuous random selection of the equilibrium correspondence E.
We start by proving that for a residual economy the equilibrium correspondence E maps each vector of spread parameters and payoff matrix into a countable set. This result is essential to prove that the equilibrium subcorrespondence is non-empty. 
. It follows that, we can obtain the return vector
Az as the product between the payoff matrixÂ and the adjusted portfolioẑ, that
Letf (w, γ, A, p 0 , p 1 , q) be the aggregate demand function, where the aggregate portfolio is replaced by the aggregate adjusted portfolio. LetÊ(γ, A) =
We first show that the number of equilibra inÊ(γ, A) is countable, hence, we conclude that the number of equilibria in E(γ, A) is at most countable. ) where 
The Inverse Function Theorem guarantees that regular equilibria are locally isolated. Therefore the number of equilibria inÊ(γ, A) is at most countable.
Since, E(γ, A) ⊆Ê(γ, A), we can state the required result.
LJ and with an exogenous vector of spread parameters γ ∈ Γ and an exogenous asset market given by the payoff matrix A ∈ A, the number of equilibria for the economy is at most countable.
) be the set of probabilities measures on ∆
for the topology of weak convergence. 
is a quasi-regular equilibrium }.
Proposition 2. If for every
there exists a continuous random selection in the equilibrium correspondence E.
Proof: To prove this proposition, actually we will prove the existence of a continuous random selection for the subcorrespondence E , but this result trivially implies the existence of a continuous random selection to the correspondence E.
The prove follows with three claims.
First claim: E (A) is non empty.
By Cass trick [see Geanakoplos [18] and Magill and Shafer [25] ] we can consider, without loss of generality, that the problem of one of the consumers is a problem with complete markets. Precisely, regarding commodities demand functions, we can consider that the budget constraint for such a consumer is defined by Second claim:
is a quasi-regular zero of E(γ, A) then for any ε > 0 no matter small, there is a ball B ε centered at (p 0 , p 1 , q) and of radius then ε such that f (w, γ, A, ., ., .) restricted to ∂B ε is of non-zero degree. By continuity, for n large enough, f (w, γ n , A n , ., ., .)
is homotopic to f (w, γ, A, ., ., .) on ∂B ε , hence f (w, γ n , A n , ., ., .) has non zero degree on ∂B ε . By the boundary theorem [see Hirsch [24] , p.136] there exist
Since ε is arbitrary we are done.
Let us now consider the correspondence E :
which applies each payoff matrix and spread parameter into a set of probabilities
) with each measure ρ ∈ E (γ, A)
Third claim: The correspondence E is lower hemicontinuous.
By the lower hemicontinuity of E , for each 1 ≤ h ≤ m, we can take a sequence
Finally, for each n, take for ρ n a probability measure supported by
Since ε is arbitrarily small, we deduce the lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence E .
The three claims proved above allow us to apply the Michael selection theorem and guarantee that there is a continuous selection in the correspondence E , which is the desired continuous random selection for the equilibrium correspondence E and finally it is also the continuous random selection for the correspondence E. egy of the remaining intermediaries, the payoff function for intermediary h will be:
where ρ(γ, A) is the continuous random selection that the intermediaries expect when they set the vector of spread parameters γ and design the asset matrix A. The asset creation is then described by a simultaneous Nash game which is
is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for 
Equilibrium and the Main Result
The equilibrium concept allows for the consistence between the two stages through which the economy evolves.
Definition 6. An equilibrium for an economy
(i) σ is an equilibrium in mixed strategies for the associated asset design game,
); h ∈ H} with σ = σ 1 ×· · ·×σ H and with σ h being a probability
(ii) α is a measure over the price set given by the Gelfand integral of the random selection with respect to the measure σ, that is, α = ρ((Γ, A))dσ.
Remark that for a function
) we have,
By words, we can say that the measure α is a price distribution which is the expected value of the continuous random selection with respect to the mixed strategies profile over vector of spread parameters and return matrices. This measure α exists because ρ is continuous for the weak * topology in the range space and therefore, Gelfand integrable. 
Purification of Equilibria
In this section we show that for an appropriate economy with incomplete information we can guarantee the existence of equilibrium in distributional strategies and moreover, we guarantee the existence of approximate equilibrium in pure strategies. The existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies follows from the Milgrom and Weber [28] theorem which asserts that for games in which the informational variables of the players have atomless distributions, each player's set of pure strategies is dense in his complete set of strategies, that is, in his set of distributional strategies.
The model in this context is similar to the previous model, namely, at the first stage of the model the intermediaries behave strategically choosing the matrix of asset market returns and the related vector of spread parameters. The intermediaries have rational expectations hence they correctly anticipate the equilibria price set corresponding to each financial structure and therefore they can evaluate the payoff associated to each financial structure. Then, we will consider as before a model with two stages. In the first stage we define a game in spreads and assets in a context of incomplete information. Using this incomplete information framework we obtain the purification of the equilibrium by exploring the Milgrom and Weber [28] results. + , that is c h = c h (α h ), and the vector α h constitutes the informational variable (or type), t h = α h . The informational structure in the set of types is defined by a probability measure η on the Borel subsets of (IR 
Definition 7. A distributional strategy for player h is a probability measure µ h , such that its marginal distribution on T is the one specified by the information structure, η h . Precisely, this restriction on the marginal distributions means that for all S ⊂ T , µ h (S ×
The payoff function of each intermediary stills being build up through the equilibrium correspondence. However we need to consider another argument in this correspondence. Let us denote byT = T H the set of intermediaries informational variable, which is the same as the set of intermediaries fixed cost functions.
We denote by α = (α 1 , ..., α H ) ⊂T a vector of parameters that define the fixed cost functions of the intermediaries. The equilibrium correspondence in this approach is the correspondence
that applies a vector of fixed cost functions parameters α = (α 1 , ..., α H ) and an asset market structure (γ, A) into the corresponding walrasian prices, that is,
Following the same steps of the proof of the proposition 9, we can also prove that the equilibrium correspondence E I contains a continuous random selection ρ (α, γ, A) . Then, the expected payoff to each player-intermediary is constructed using the random selection in the same way of the previous section.
Therefore, given a numeraire asset market economy with incomplete information , π((µ 1 , . .., µ n ))+ ε ≥ π ((µ 1 , ..., µ i , ..., µ n ) ). 
Proposition 4. There is a set
converges to
[see E.4.1 (i)in Mas-Collel [26] ]. Then the payoff function of each intermediary is continuous. By assumption (C.1) the type set is compact then we obtain the equicontinuity of payoffs [see Royden [31] When η h is atomless, the set of pure strategies is dense in the set of distributional strategies [see Milgrom and Weber [28] , theorem 3], for each intermediary h = 1, ..., H. This denseness property together with the continuity of the payoffs allow us to conclude that there is a pure strategy profile arbitrarily near any mixed strategy equilibrium which is therefore an ε-equilibrium.
The concept of equilibrium for this economy with incomplete information differs from the previous one precisely in the kind of strategy profile of the first stage game, namely, in this economy with incomplete information the strategies are distributional strategy instead of mixed strategies.
Definition 10. A pair (µ, ϕ) is a distributional equilibrium for an economy
(i) µ is an equilibrium profile in distributional strategies for the associated game
( 
ii) ϕ is a measure over prices given by the Gelfand integral of the random selection integrated with respect to the measure
The homogeneity of degree zero, in prices, of the fist period budget constraint 
(ii) The first period auctioneer solves:
, we can rewrite the problem:
(iii) The second period auctioneers solves:
This generalized game satisfies the assumptions of Debreu on existence of strategic equilibria. Let ((x,z),p 0 ,p 1 ,q) be a strategic equilibrium. The first period budget constraint of each consumer implies,
0. Thus, in equilibrium, the consumption bundle of the first period satisfies,
By (ii) we also have 
and therefore there exists a converging sub- Let us now prove that
The first order conditions of the optimization problem of the period-0 auctioneer imply that
where β is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
which implies β = 0 and therefore there is no free disposal. Finally, since (x 0 , x 1 , λ, z, µ) is:
It is easy to observe that the matrix J is non-singular. In fact, let y = (x 0 ,x 1 ,λ,ẑ,μ)
such that Jy = 0, then y Jy = 0 (which using Jy = 0) reduces tox 0 (D }. There is a countable number of product sets
For every u 1 ∈ U and every w These commodities and portfolio demand are those generated by the economy 
where N = (p 0 , p 1 ) · (w 
Notice that, by Cass trick [ Geanakoplos [18] or Magill and Shafer [25] ] we can consider, without loss of generality, that first consumer's problem is a solution of a problem with complete markets. Thus, by duality theory (see, for example, Diewert (1982)), we obtain that if ε is sufficiently small, then for all 
is the corresponding initial endowment that we are looking for. Thus, the lemma is proved if we show that for any ε > 0, there exists (y, t) such that F (u y 1 ,w 1 t ) is transverse to 0. In order to obtain the result, we define . Note that by construction
= 0 for every j = j , j ), therefore, it suffices to show that the rank of the matrix
is ((L − 1)(S + 1) +Ĵ).
To calculate this rank, remember that (y 
